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Abstract
We propose a new method for measuring the quality of banks￿credit portfolios.
This method makes use of information impounded in bank share prices by exploiting
di⁄erences in their sensitivity to credit default swap spreads of borrowers of varying
quality. The method allows us to derive a credit risk indicator (CRI), which is the
perceived share of high risk exposures in a bank￿ s portfolio. We estimate CRIs for the
150 largest U.S. bank holding companies and ￿nd that they have strong predictive
power for the BHCs￿performance during the subprime crisis, even after controlling
for a variety of traditional asset quality proxies. Interestingly, we also ￿nd that the
BHCs￿aggregate CRI did not deteriorate since the beginning of the subprime crisis.
This suggests that the market was aware of their (average) exposure to high risk
credit.
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11 Introduction
It is of great value to the ￿nancial system to have informative and comprehensive indicators
of the quality of banks￿assets. Such indicators allow regulators to monitor general trends in
the ￿nancial system. They also permit them to easily identify weak banks and to put them
under increased regulatory scrutiny. For example, many of the current banking failures, and
their serious systemic rami￿cations, could have presumably been avoided if the high-risk
nature of the investments at some banks had become apparent at an earlier stage. Easily
accessible information about the quality of banks￿investments is also crucial for bank
shareholders and debtors. It allows them to assess the performance of bank managers and
to better evaluate the risks to which banks are exposed. This, in turn, enhances e¢ ciency
at banks by exposing their managers to greater market discipline.
Unfortunately, such indicators are di¢ cult to obtain. Banks￿business is complex and
wide-ranging. In particular, due to the variety of information required in judging the
riskiness of their lending activities, there do not exist good measures of the quality of their
loan portfolios. In order to obtain proxies of loan quality one typically relies on accounting
data, such as, for example, the share of non-performing loans in a bank￿ s portfolio, or the
ratio of loan-loss allowances to total loans.1 These proxies have a range of shortcomings.
For one, the scope of accounting data is limited. They miss important information (such
as that contained in analyst reports or in the form of informal knowledge, e.g., a bank
manager￿ s reputation). They are also mostly backward looking in nature, while ideally one
would like to have a measure of a bank￿ s future risk. The low frequency of publication of
accounting data also means that these proxies cannot re￿ ect new information readily. The
reliance on accounting-based data also su⁄ers from the problem that loan-quality data is
to a large extent at the discretion of banks themselves.2 This is especially a concern if
investors or supervisors base their decisions on such data. The construction of appealing
indicators of asset quality is also complicated by the fact that banks nowadays undertake
a variety of activities that expose them to credit risk. Beside their traditional lending
business, banks trade in credit derivatives, take part in complex securitizations or grant
credit lines. Many of those activities are o⁄-balance sheet. And even if banks report them,
and do so systematically, it is di¢ cult to condense them into a comprehensive measure.
1See, among others, Berger and DeYoung (1997), Wheelock and Wilson (2000), Hubbard, Kuttner and
Palia (2002), DeYoung (2003) and Kwan (2003).
2There is widespread evidence that banks strategically manage the reporting of their loan loss data (see
Wall and Koch (2000) for a survey of U.S. evidence and Hasan and Wall (2004) for international evidence).
There is also evidence that banks delay provisioning for loans until cyclical downturns have already set in
(Laeven and Majnoni, 2003).
2In this paper we develop a new method for measuring a bank￿ s credit quality. Rather
than using balance sheet data, this method is based on the information impounded in
banks￿share prices. The general appeal in using share prices is that they represent the
market￿ s overall assessment of a bank, and thus re￿ ect a wide range of information. Our
basic idea for how information about credit quality can be extracted from share prices
is the following. Suppose that there are two types of loans in the economy, high-risk and
low-risk loans, and suppose a bank￿ s portfolio contains mostly high-risk loans. That bank￿ s
share price should then react relatively strongly to news about changes in the default risk
of high-risk loans, but less so to news about low-risk loans. Thus, the bank￿ s relative share
price sensitivity to either type of news gives information about the perceived quality of its
loan portfolio.
In our empirical implementation we identify default risk news as changes in the spreads
of a high and a low risk credit default swap (CDS) index. For this we assign high and low
risks to subinvestment grade and investment grade indices, respectively.3 The two indices
can then be used to estimate share price sensitivities. From these sensitivities one can in
turn derive a bank￿ s credit risk indicator (CRI), which is de￿ned as the ratio of a bank￿ s
high-risk sensitivity to its total (high-risk plus low-risk) sensitivity. Loosely speaking, the
CRI thus measures the share of high risk exposures in a bank￿ s portfolio, as perceived by
the market.
We believe that this measure has several attractive features. Since it is market-based, it
is forward looking and can incorporate new information quickly. It is also a comprehensive
measure of a bank￿ s credit quality. For example, for a bank￿ s CRI it does not matter
whether the bank acquired a high-risk exposure via lending to a low quality borrower, or
by writing protection on a low quality underlying in the CDS market, or by buying a junior
tranche of a Collateralized Loan Obligation. The CRI measures the quality of a bank￿ s
overall credit exposure, regardless of its source. Another advantage of the CRI is that it is
based on the market￿ s assessment of the bank, and not on the bank￿ s assessment of itself.
It is thus more di¢ cult to manipulate. In fact, given our methodology, this would require
banks to consistently in￿ uence their daily relative share price reactions to credit news in
the economy.4
We estimate CRIs for the 150 largest U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs).5 We ￿nd
3CDS spreads have the advantage that they are considered a relatively clean and e¢ cient measure of
default risk. For example, there is evidence that a substantial part of price discovery takes place in these
instruments (see Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) and Norden and Weber (forthcoming)).
4As we argue in the paper, our methodology of computing the CRI from daily sensitivities also mitigates
the in￿ uence of any noise in share prices.
5We make the CRIs available at http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/ww243/CRI.xls.
3that their CRIs display substantial variation. Among the ten largest BHCs, for example,
Citigroup has a much larger CRI than its peers, implying that it is considered as having
relatively worse exposures.6 We also analyze the evolution of the BHCs￿aggregate CRI
over time. We ￿nd that during our sample period (February 2006 until February 2008)
their aggregate CRI was relatively stable. In particular, it did not change signi￿cantly
after February 2007, when problems with subprime loans ￿rst materialized in the ￿nancial
system. The market thus seems to have been (on average) aware of the BHCs￿high-
risk exposures. To the extent that the decline in bank share prices during the subprime
crisis was due to credit risk (and not, for example, liquidity and funding problems), it
should hence be attributed to news about the default risk on high and low risk loans itself
(materializing in a widening CDS spread for both subinvestment grade and investment
grade exposures) and not to news about the composition of the BHCs￿exposures.
We next address the question of how a bank￿ s CRI is related to traditional measures
of asset quality. We ￿nd that the CRIs are positively and signi￿cantly related to most
measures of loan riskiness, such as the share of non-performing loans or loan-loss allowances.
They are also positively related to factors that have been found to proxy high loan risk,
such as past loan growth or the interest income on loans. We also ￿nd that banks with a
higher share of real estate loans have signi￿cantly higher CRIs, which is consistent with
the notion that a large part of the problem loans at banks are in the form of mortgages.
We conclude from the analysis that the CRI seems to re￿ ect a variety of information on
bank risk.
The CRI may hence be a useful predictor of bank performance in downturns. This is
because in a downturn the default risk of high-risk borrowers increases by more than the
default risk for low-risk borrowers. Banks with a higher CRI should thus su⁄er relatively
more. We test this relationship using the subprime crisis (during which the gap between
the spread on high and low risk exposure widened). For this we ￿rst regress a banks￿
share price change since July 2007 (the time when problems with subprime loans became
a widespread phenomenon) on its CRI estimated using information before this date. We
￿nd a signi￿cant and negative relationship between the bank￿ s CRI and its share price
performance. The relationship survives both in signi￿cance and magnitude if we control
for a variety of other variables, such as various proxies of loan quality, bank leverage and
share price beta. We also ￿nd that the traditional measures of asset quality do not explain
equally well banks￿performance during the subprime crisis. Second, we compute CRIs for
banks that failed during the crisis and compare them to the ones of other banks. We ￿nd
6Interestingly, Citigroup is up to now also the bank that has incurred the largest write-downs in the
subprime crisis.
4that the CRI of a failed bank was about 2-3 times the average CRI in our entire sample.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the use
of market-based information on bank risk. In Section 3 we develop the methodology for
measuring the CRI. The section also contains a general discussion of the CRI. Section 4
contains the empirical analysis. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 Market-Based Information on Bank Risk
In recent years there has been a growing interest in using market-based information to
measure bank risk. This is on the back of evidence suggesting that the market does well
in evaluating the risks at ￿nancial institutions. Sachs, Huizinga and Shoven (1987), for
example, show that the share prices of U.S. banks re￿ ected investment in troubled LDC
debt in line with actual exposures. Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) ￿nd that investors were
able to distinguish between banks based on their level of exposure to the Mexican debt
default in 1982. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) examine subordinated notes and debentures
of banks and conclude that investors can rationally di⁄erentiate among the risks undertaken
by the major banks. Morgan and Stiroh (2000) ￿nd that a bank￿ s asset composition is
re￿ ected in its bond spreads. They show that, for example, when a bank increases its
share of commercial and industrial loans, this causes its bond spread to widen. Hancock
and Kwast (2001) ￿nd that subordinated debt spreads consistently re￿ ect the risks of large
banks.
There is also evidence that market information has predictive power for banks. Berger,
Davies and Flannery (2000) ￿nd that market information, such as abnormal stock re-
turns, can forecast bank performance. Evano⁄ and Wall (2001) show that subordinated
debt spreads predict changes in supervisory ratings better than capital ratios. Lopez and
Krainer (2004) ￿nd that an equity-based distance-to-default measure can predict changes
in supervisory ratings up to four quarters. Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006) analyze the in-
formation content of stock and bond based indicators for European banks. They ￿nd that
the distance-to-default measure has high predictive power in explaining rating changes,
whereas subordinated debt spreads have signal value close to default.
There now seems to be a consensus that market information does indeed contain useful
information about banks￿risks (for surveys, see Flannery (1998) and Flannery (2001)).
This has led to a growing interest in using market-based information for supervisory pur-
poses. The most rigorous result is, perhaps, the subordinated debt proposal (e.g. U.S.
Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2000)). This proposal puts forward the idea
that banks should issue tradable junior debt. Regulators can then monitor the spreads on
5these debts and force action if they widen too much. There are also approaches to use
market information to obtain indices of systemic risk. Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006)
propose such an index for supervisory purposes. This index gauges systemic risk from the
covariances of bank asset values, as obtained from their share prices.
3 The Credit Risk Indicator
Consider a prototypical balance sheet of a bank. On the asset side we have cash holdings
(C), securities (S) and loans (Loans). On the liability side we have debt (D) and equity
(E), with equity being the residual claim (E = C + S + Loans ￿ D). In terms of market
values (V (:)), we can thus write
V (E) = V (C) + V (S) + V (Loans) ￿ V (D): (1)
We express all variables in unit of shares. The market value of equity is then simply given
by the bank￿ s share price: V (E) = p. The market value of cash can be set equal to its
book value: V (C) = C. The value of the securities will be determined by market prices.
The market value of debt is obtained by discounting its book value with an appropriate
interest rate: V (D) = D
1+rD.
In order to obtain market values for the loans, we have to take into account the risk
of default. We denote a loan￿ s probability of default by PD and its loss given default
(expressed as a share of the face value) by LGD. The expected loss on a loan is thus given
by EL = PD ￿ LGD. We assume that there are two types of loans, high risk and low risk
loans. The amounts due on each type of loan are denoted with H and L, respectively, and
we have ELH > ELL. The value of the loan portfolio can then be expressed as
V (Loans) =
H(1 ￿ ELH) + L(1 ￿ ELL)
1 + rLoan : (2)






We use as a proxy for the expected losses on high and low risk loans the spreads of two
(economy-wide) Credit Default Swaps (CDS) indices.7 CDS spreads provide a fairly clean
measure of default risk since they represent the compensation the market requires for taking
on credit risk. This is because the writer of the CDS has to be compensated by the buyer
of protection for the expected loss on the underlying credit (consisting of the product of
7These indices are discussed in greater detail in Section 4.1.
6PD and LGD). The price of a CDS (which is expressed as a spread) hence approximates






In our empirical work, CDSH and CDSL will be the prices (spreads) of a CDS-index con-
sisting of a representative sample of subinvestment grade and investment grade exposures
in the economy.
The CRI can be obtained as follows. We can ￿rst write equation (1) in terms of changes
4V (E) = 4V (C) + 4V (S) + 4V (Loans) ￿ 4V (D); (5)
where 4 indicates the (absolute) change from t ￿ 1 to t. Assume for the moment that
interest rates are constant. We can replace V (C);V (S);V (Loans) and V (D) in (5) with
the expressions derived earlier. We approximate the change in the value of a bank￿ s security
portfolio with the change in a market index, denoted M. Given security holdings of S, the
absolute change is then given by 4V (S) ￿ 4M S
M. We hence have for the change in the






1 + rLoans 4 CDS
H ￿
L
1 + rLoans 4 CDS
L. (6)
We can then estimate the following relationship at the bank level
4pi;t = ￿i + ￿i 4 Mt + ￿i 4 CDS
H
t + ￿i 4 CDS
L
t + ￿i 4 Zt + "i;t; (7)
where i denotes the bank, t denotes time, and Z is a vector of control variables for changes
in the discount factors. Noting that ￿i = ￿
Hi
1+rLoans and ￿i = ￿
Li
1+rLoans, the CRI (=
Hi
Hi+Li)





We can hence obtain the CRI by ￿rst estimating b ￿i and b ￿i, and then applying (8).
3.1 The CRI: A Discussion
In deriving the CRI we have presumed that a bank￿ s credit risk derives exclusively from
loans. Banks, however, also have credit risk exposures from other investments. Since the
CRI is derived from share price sensitivities to credit risk in general (and not speci￿cally
8Note that the equivalent of (6) with relative changes does not hold. Dividing (6) by p we obtain
(focusing on high risk loans only):
4p







CDSH . Hence, for a given loan portfolio H
relative changes in the CDS spread (
4CDS
H





p is constant over time (which is unlikely to be the case).
7loan-risk), it captures those as well. The CRI should hence be interpreted as a measure
of the overall riskiness of a bank￿ s credit assets. For example, a bank may have a large
CRI because it has sold credit protection on a risky borrower using CDS or because it
has a risky bond portfolio (consisting of, for instance, mainly subinvestment grade names).
Credit exposures may also arise from banks￿securitization activities, which are playing a
crucial role in the current turmoil in the ￿nancial system. For example, in a Collateralized
Loan Obligation (CLO) banks typically sell the lower-risk senior and mezzanine tranches,
but retain the high risk equity tranche (these tranches are typically unrated but perceived
to be well below investment grade). This lowers the average quality of the bank￿ s credit
exposures and increases a bank￿ s CRI. By contrast, if a bank were to acquire AAA-rated
(super-senior) tranches from securitizations, its average credit risk exposure may improve
and hence its CRI would decrease.
In deriving the CRI we have assumed that banks have either high or low-risk exposures,
which in our empirical implementation we take to be representative subinvestment and
investment grade exposures (as given by the two respective CDS indices). Banks have,
however, a variety of credit exposures, which will obviously not all fall neatly into these
two categories. The CRI is thus not strictly the share of a bank￿ s subinvestment grade
exposures, but should be more generally interpreted as a measure of the average riskiness
of a bank￿ s credit exposures. Suppose, for example, that a bank has a loan portfolio
that consists only of loans that have risk characteristics just between the representative
investment and subinvestment grade loan. The banks￿share price should then (on average)
react similarly to subinvestment and investment grade CDS spread changes. Hence the
bank￿ s CRI would be 1
2 (which is the same as for a bank whose loan portfolio consists
of equal parts of subinvestment and investment grade exposures) even though the bank
has no real subinvestment exposures at all. Moreover, since the representative investment
and subinvestment grade exposures in the CDS index are not representing the lowest and
highest possible credit risk in the economy, a bank￿ s CRI is also not constrained to lie
between zero and one. For instance, a bank that mainly has exposures of a higher quality
than the representative investment grade credit in the CDS index will have a CRI smaller
than zero, while banks with a portfolio quality below the representative subinvestment
grade will have a CRI greater than one.
It should be emphasized that the CRI measures the relative sensitivities to high and
low credit risk, that is, it relates to the composition of the bank￿ s credit exposure. It
should hence not be confused with a bank￿ s absolute sensitivity to credit risk. The latter,
besides the composition of the credit portfolio itself, will also be determined by the size of
its credit portfolio and its leverage. For example, all else being equal, the share price of
8a highly leveraged bank will be more sensitive to changes in credit conditions than is the
case for a bank with lower leverage. This emphasizes that the CRI should only be used as
a measure of the quality of a bank￿ s credit portfolio (and ideally in conjunction with other
risk measures) and not as a sole measure of bank risk.9
Since the CRI is derived from share prices, it represents the market￿ s assessment of
banks￿credit risk. This assessment will be based on a variety of information, including
for instance accounting data and analyst forecasts. However, as the current crisis is again
reminding us, banks are opaque institutions.10 Hence, it should be kept in mind that the
CRI is the equivalent of the market￿ s ￿best guess￿of a bank￿ s portfolio credit quality, and
may hence di⁄er from its true quality.11 Moreover, even though share prices may contain a
wide range of useful information, they may arguably also be subject to noise. An advantage
of our empirical implementation is that it computes CRIs from daily share price responses
over a longer period of time (526 trading days in our sample). The impact of any noise in
returns is likely to cancel out over so many observations and thus its in￿ uence on the CRI
is likely to be limited. Another advantage is that the CRI relies on sensitivities, and not
on share price levels. If there is, for example, a bubble due to (unjusti￿ed) optimism about
credit risk, this will a⁄ect the bank￿ s valuation, but not its responsiveness to credit risk.
It should also be kept in mind that we measure relative share price sensitivities. Thus,
even if there is some mispricing which a⁄ects the absolute response to credit risk news, it
is di¢ cult to conceive how such a mispricing might alter the relative response to high and
low risk credit news. And even if it does, this should a⁄ect all banks and hence not distort
the cross-section of CRIs, which is the main interest of our analysis.12
Another issue is that CDS spreads may not only re￿ ect credit risk. This is even though
9A high CRI itself is also not necessarily an indication of bad management. If the bank is adequately
compensated for the risk it takes on (for example, through higher interest rates), a high-CRI bank may
very well be pro￿table in normal times. Nevertheless, we would expect such a bank to be more vulnerable
to downturns.
10Whether banks are more opaque than other institutions remains a debated issue. Morgan (2002)
￿nds that there are more rating disagreements for banks, suggesting higher opacity. Flannery, Kwan and
Nimalendran (2004), by contrast, analyze market microstructure properties (such as bid-ask spreads) and
￿nd no evidence that banks are less transparent than similar non-￿nancial ￿rms.
11An observed change in a bank￿ s CRI thus does not necessarily imply that the bank has actually altered
its credit portfolio, but may also be due to new information that causes the market to re-evaluate the credit
quality of a bank. We return to this point later in Section 4.2 when we consider the evolution of banks￿
CRIs.
12The fact that the CRI measures relative sensitivities also means that any non-linearities of the value
of equity with respect to the value of the bank assets will cancel out (see Appendix A for the derivations).
Such non-linearities arise, for example, in the Merton-model due to the option-value embedded in equity
and may particularly matter for a bank that is close to default.
9CDS prices are typically considered to be a relatively clean measure of credit risk (as op-
posed to bond spreads, for example). In fact, recent research has suggested the existence
of other pricing factors in CDS spreads, such as liquidity premia.13 If CDS prices move
because of news unrelated to credit risk, this may result in the absolute share prices re-
sponsiveness to credit risk being underestimated. However, this is less of a concern in our
case since this will be the case for both high and low credit risk and hence the CRI is not
necessarily a⁄ected. And even if it a⁄ected the high and low risk sensitivities di⁄erently,
this should consistently be the case across banks, and hence not distort the cross-sectional
ranking of CRIs.
4 The Empirical Evidence
4.1 Data
We estimate CRIs for U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) that are classi￿ed as com-
mercial banks and listed in the U.S. (the reason why we focus on BHCs instead of the
commercial bank(s) belonging to the BHCs is that it is typically the BHC which is listed).
We exclude foreign banks (even when listed in the U.S.), pure investment banks and banks
for which complete data was not available. Of the remaining banks, we take the 150 largest
ones by asset size.
We collect daily data on banks￿share prices, two CDS indices (to be discussed in more
detail below), short-term and long-term interest rates, an in￿ ation proxy, and a market
return from Datastream and the FRED database. Additionally, various balance sheet data
are collected from the FR Y-9C Consolidated Financial Statements for BHCs. The sample
ranges from February 01, 2006 to February 08, 2008. The starting point of the sample was
determined by the availability of reliable CDS data.
For the high and low risk CDS index we take the ￿Dow Jones CDX North America
Crossover￿ index (￿XO index￿ ) and the ￿Dow Jones CDX North America Investment
Grade￿index (￿IG index￿ ). These indices are jointly managed by the Dow Jones Company,
Markit and a consortium of market makers in the CDS market and are considered the
leading CDS indices for North American underlyings. The IG index consists of 125 equally
weighted U.S. reference entities with ratings ranging from BBB up to AAA. These reference
entities are the most liquid entities traded in the CDS market and represent large companies
in various industries. The XO index consists of 35 equally weighted U.S. reference entities
that have ratings ranging from B up to BBB (hence the term crossover, as it also represents
13For example, Amato (2005) and Bongaerts, de Jong and Driessen (2008).
10credit risk on the border to investment grade quality).14 The reason why this index has
fewer reference entities is not known to us but is likely to be due to the fact that there are
less (liquid) CDS of such underlyings.
The indices are available for di⁄erent maturities, ranging from one to ten years. We
focus on the 5-year maturity index, which is the reference maturity for CDS contracts. The
indices are rolled over twice a year (that is, the constituent￿ s list is checked and adjusted
if necessary) and assigned a new roll number. We always use the newest roll (￿on-the-
run￿ ), as this is the most liquid one.15 Both CDS indices are expressed in basis points
(bps) of spreads. A higher spread implies a higher cost of hedging credit risk, and hence a
higher implied default risk. Figure 1 shows the evolution of both indices over the sample
period. The XO index has a larger spread since it represents riskier underlyings. We can
also observe that the di⁄erence between the XO and the IG spread narrowed up to the
beginning of 2007 but has widened since then. The latter is consistent with the stylized
fact that in periods of crisis, the default risk of riskier borrowers increases by more than
the one of safer borrowers. We can also observe that, even though the spreads tend to
move together, they do not do so perfectly (if they were, we could not identify the CRI,
which is based on relative sensitivities).
For our main regression (equation 7) we use the following variables. For the control
variables Zt (which capture proxies for discount rates) we include a short term and a long
term interest rate (the 1-month and the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate) and an
in￿ ation-proxy (the di⁄erence between the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate and
the 10-Year Treasury In￿ ation-Indexed Security at Constant Maturity).16 For the market
return, we take the S&P 500. We orthogonalize the S&P 500 return with both CDS indices
in order to include only the part of the market movements which are unrelated to changes
in credit risk (a similar approach has been followed by, for example, Longsta⁄ (2008)).
As for the CDS-indices itself, we have seen in Figure 1 that they are highly correlated.
14Both indices together cover a large part of the overall rating distribution (from AAA to B). We checked
the distribution of loans of U.S. banks since 2000 using the Dealscan database (which contains mainly large
syndicated loans) and found that the share of loans with ratings below B was only 2%. An alternative to
using the CDX index is the ABX index, which covers subprime mortgage loans. However, our aim in this
paper is to estimate a general credit risk indicator, and not one that is tailored to the current crisis.
15When changing between di⁄erent rolls, the underlying reference entities may change as well (typically,
between 6-9 entities are replaced from one roll to another). This may cause a jump in the index unrelated
to a change in credit risk in the economy. However, it turns out that these jumps are very small in our
sample, and hence our results are unlikely to be a⁄ected by them.
16We initially considered more control variables such as the default spread (the di⁄erence between AAA
and BBB rated bonds) and interest rates with even longer maturities. However, preliminary tests revealed
that they had weak explanatory power for bank share prices.
11This may result in their individual regression coe¢ cients being not reliably estimated. We
hence orthogonalize the CDS prices on each other. This e⁄ectively attributes the common
component of credit risk changes to either the high or the low credit risk, depending on
the chosen direction of the orthogonalization. A direct consequence of this will be that the
proportion of the risk type (high or low) to which the common factor is allocated will be
overestimated. This not a problem for our analysis since we are mainly interested in how
CRIs di⁄er across banks. This ranking should not be in￿ uenced by the orthogonalization
since the bias it may introduce a⁄ects the CRIs of all banks. In our analysis we chose to
orthogonalize the IG-spread (thus, we include only IG-spread changes unrelated to changes
in the XO-index).17
4.2 The Aggregate CRI
Before turning to the estimation of banks￿individual CRIs, we ￿rst analyze their aggregate
CRI. For this we run a pooled version of equation (7). Speci￿cally, we estimate the following
regression on daily data:






t + ￿￿Zt + "i;t; (9)
where pi;t is a bank￿ s share price, S&P500
(orth)
t the orthogonalized S&P 500 index, CDSXO
t
the XO CDS index, CDS
IG(orth)
t the orthogonalized IG CDS index, and Zt the vector of
control variables. Note that all variables are expressed in absolute changes, consistent with
the model developed in Section 3. We exclude day-bank observations at which a stock was
not traded in order to reduce the impact of any illiquidity in bank stock prices.
Table 1, column 1, contains the regression results. All variables have the expected
sign and are, apart from the long-term interest rate, also signi￿cant. In particular, the
two variables of interest, ￿CDSXO and ￿CDSIG(orth), are highly signi￿cant and have the
correct, that is negative, sign. The second but last row in the Table reports the implied
CRI, as computed from equation (8), which is about 0:11. As discussed earlier, the absolute
level of a CRI on its own is not informative since it is in￿ uenced by the orthogonalization
method. We therefore do not interpret its value. We note that the CRI is quite precisely
estimated. The last row in the table contains the 95% con￿dence interval for the CRI,
computed using the (non-linear) Wald-Test. It shows that the CRI￿ s con￿dence interval is
between 0:10 and 0:12.
17The results are, however, invariant to the direction of the orthogonalization, as the correlation of the
banks￿CRIs across the methods of orthogonalization is nearly one (￿ = 0:95) and the rank-correlation is
equal to one.
12It is, however, informative to study whether the aggregate CRI has changed over time.
For this we split our sample into two equal parts and estimate separate CRIs for each
subsample (the sample split is on February 02, 2007). The results are reported in the last
two columns of Table 1.18 One can see that the sensitivities in each subsample are still
precisely estimated, and that their values are similar across samples. Also, the implied
CRIs are very similar (0:1157 versus 0:1137). They are, in particular, not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from each other, as can be seen from their con￿dence intervals.
This suggests that market participants were (on average) aware of the BHCs￿exposures
to high risk investments well before the subprime crisis fully materialized. This ￿nding is
interesting given the fact that bank share prices declined signi￿cantly during the subprime
crisis. It suggests that the source of their share price decline was not news about their (av-
erage) portfolio composition,19 but that the decline was due to other factors. For example,
during the subprime crisis the default risks on investment and subinvestment grade expo-
sures increased sharply (as can be seen in Figure 1, showing that CDS spreads widened).
This causes a decline in banks￿share prices regardless of whether there are updates about
banks￿portfolio compositions.
We next investigate the evolution of the CRI in more detail using a rolling window
analysis. Figure 2 shows the coe¢ cient of the aggregate CRI over the sample period using
a window-length of 90 days (note that in the ￿gure, the coe¢ cients are plotted against
the last day of the window). One can see that the aggregate CRI is relatively stable over
time, except for three periods: February 2007, July/August 2007 and January/February
2008. During these periods the CRI ￿ uctuates widely but stabilizes itself afterwards at its
previous level.
All three periods are associated with major turbulences in ￿nancial markets. This ￿rst
period (February 2007) coincides with the time at which ￿rst warning signs about large
losses connected to subprime lending emerge. For example, on February 22 HSBC ￿res
the head of its US mortgage lending business as losses reach $10.5bn; the largest US house
builder DR Horton warns of huge losses from subprime fall-out (March 8), and shares in
New Century Financial, one of the largest subprime lenders in the US, are suspended on
March 12 due to fears that it might be heading for bankruptcy. The second period (August
2007) is typically considered as the time where subprime problems become apparent at
a wider scale. It starts with Bear Stearns bailing out two of its funds exposed to the
18Note that the number of observations in the ￿rst and second part of the sample can di⁄er (although
the number of days is the same). This is because we only include observations where the stock of a bank
is actively traded.
19Obviously, there have been updates about individual bank￿ s exposures. Our results only say that there
is no net e⁄ect for the average bank.
13subprime market for $3.2bn (June 22). Various European and American banks also revealed
further large losses connected to subprime mortgages. In addition, global stock markets fall
dramatically and interbank money markets dry up. The third period (January/February),
where the CRI ￿ uctuates more moderately, coincides with another wave of bad news about
losses connected to subprime lending, forcing several major ￿nancial institutions to issue
new capital.
One suspects that the estimations of the CRI have been obscured during these periods
through the large and erratic swings in both bank stock prices and CDS prices. This is
con￿rmed by the standard errors of the estimated of CRIs: while the median standard error
of a CRI in a rolling window is about 0.0135, the standard error reaches 0.240 in the ￿rst
trouble period and 0.148 in the second. The CRIs in this periods are hence not precisely
estimated. We thus conclude that the rolling window analysis con￿rms the ￿rst impression
from a simple sample split, namely that during our sample period there have apparently
not been any substantial and lasting updates about the (average) exposure of the BHCs
to high risk credits.
4.3 Individual CRIs
We now turn to the analysis of the BHCs individual CRIs. For this, we estimate equation
(9) on the bank level. That is, we estimate for each bank the following equation






t + ￿i￿Zt + "i;t: (10)
Using equation (8), we can then compute for each bank its CRI from the estimated ￿i
and ￿i. Table 2 reports some summary statistics.20 The mean CRI across all 150 banks
is 0.1143, which is similar to the previously estimated aggregate CRI, 0.1103. The (cross-
sectional) standard deviation of the CRIs is 0.0626. The lowest CRI among the banks
is -0.0329, while the largest CRI takes the value of 0.4433. As discussed in Section 3, a
negative CRI is not inconsistent with our model since a bank may have credit exposures
that are on average of higher quality than the average entity in the investment grade CDS
index.
Figure 3 depicts the individual CRIs, ordering BHCs by asset size (starting with the
smallest BHC). We can see that there is in fact only one BHC with a negative CRI. There
are also three positive outliers, with CRIs above 0.3. Most other banks have CRIs in the
range between 0.07 and 0.17. We checked the estimation results of the four apparent outlier
banks, and it turned out that their CRIs are imprecisely estimated. In fact, their standard
errors are each among the ￿ve highest of all banks, and also far above the average of their
20The complete list of the CRIs is available at http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/ww243/CRI.xls.
14peers. This suggests that these outliers are likely to be due to estimation imprecision,
arising, for example, from relatively illiquid stocks21. Leaving the outliers aside, no clear
pattern emerges among the (asset-ranked) BHCs. An exception are perhaps the very
largest banks. The top ten banks seem on average to have CRIs above the mean. Among
those banks in turn, Citigroup (the ￿rst dot in the Figure) has the highest CRI.
4.4 The CRI and Other Measures of Bank Risk
It is an interesting question whether (and how) a bank￿ s CRI is related to traditional
measures of loan quality, and proxies of bank risk more generally. To analyze this, we
could simply study (on the bank level) the correlation between these measures and the
estimated CRIs. However, this is not e¢ cient since information from the ￿rst step (the
estimation of the CRIs itself) is then not fully used in the second step (computation of the
correlations).22 It can also create a problem of generated regressors, an issue to which we
return later.
Instead, we develop a method which allows us to (e¢ ciently) estimate the relationship
in one step.23 For this we adjust the equation for the aggregate CRI (9) in order to allow the
CDS-sensitivities to depend on a variable for bank risk, say variable X. More speci￿cally,
we include in the regression for each CDS-spread an interaction term with X, where X is
expressed relative to its sample mean ( e X). We thus estimate the following regression:
￿pi;t = ￿ + ￿￿S&P500
(orth)
t + (￿ + ￿(Xi ￿ e X))￿CDS
XO
t
+(￿ + ￿(Xi ￿ e X))￿CDS
IG(orth)
t + ￿￿Zt + "i;t: (11)
Note that if the coe¢ cients for the interaction terms are zero (￿ = ￿ = 0), this equation
is identical to equation (9). The CRI is, as before, given by the ratio of the estimated
high-risk CDS-sensitivity and the total CDS sensitivity. Analogous to equation (8), this is
CRI(X) =
￿ + ￿(X ￿ e X)
￿ + ￿(X ￿ e X) + ￿ + ￿(X ￿ e X)
: (12)
Di⁄erentiating equation (12) with respect to X, we obtain the marginal sensitivity of the
21We calculated trading volumes for these banks and found that they are substantially lower than the
average of their peers: the median volume of the outliers are 5,400, 20,900, 28,700 and 57,700 stocks per
day, compared to an average median of 813,000 across all banks.
22In particular the precision with which the CRIs are estimated di⁄ers across banks and one would like
to give banks with less precisely estimated CRIs a lower weight.
23Note that our problem here di⁄ers from the usual two-step regression problem in that the variable of
interest estimated in the ￿rst step (the CRI) is a (non-linear) combination of coe¢ cients, and not simply
a coe¢ cient itself.
15CRI with respect to X:
CRI
0(X) =
￿(￿ + ￿(X ￿ e X) + ￿ + ￿(X ￿ e X)) ￿ (￿ + ￿)(￿ + ￿(X ￿ e X))
￿
￿ + ￿(X ￿ e X) + ￿ + ￿(X ￿ e X)
￿2 : (13)
Evaluating equation (13) at the mean (X = e X) gives
CRI




CRI 0(X)X= e X is the counterpart of the coe¢ cient on X in a two-step regression where in
the second step the CRIs (estimated in the ￿rst step) are regressed on X . The relationship
between the CRI and a variable X can thus be estimated as follows. We ￿rst estimate
(11). From the coe¢ cients we then calculate the coe¢ cient for X, CRI 0(X)X= e X, using
equation (14). Whether the relationship is a signi￿cant one is then determined by carrying
out a (non-linear) Wald-test of
￿￿￿￿￿
(￿+￿)2 = 0.
Table 3 shows for various variables their estimated relationship with the CRI.24 Note
that these are essentially a number of univariate relationships since we run (11) for each
variable and then compute its relationship with the CRI. The ￿rst two columns of the table
report the relationships based on the entire sample period. The last two columns refer to
regressions in which the period from June 15 to August 31, 2007 is excluded. This is the
period of the most extreme ￿ uctuations (as seen in Figures 1 and 2) in our sample. It turns
out that the exclusion makes many coe¢ cients rise (in absolute values), making several of
them signi￿cant. This is probably due to the fact that this period introduces a signi￿cant
amount of noise, which may in some cases obscure the overall relationship. We thus prefer
to interpret the results based on an exclusion of this period.
The ￿rst four variables in the table are traditional measure of banks￿loan risk: non-
performing loans, loan-loss provisions, loan-loss allowances25 and net charge-o⁄s (all four
scaled by total loans). They all have the expected sign (positive) and are signi￿cant at the
10% level, except for the loan loss allowances. Thus, banks whose balance sheet indicates
that they have a lower loan quality also have a higher CRI, that is they are perceived by
the market as having riskier exposures.
The next four variables represent common proxies of asset risk. The ￿rst variable
considered is the bank￿ s ratio of total risk-weighted assets to total assets. This measure,
however, turns out to be not signi￿cantly related to a bank￿ s CRI. Another variable which
has been found to proxy asset risk is loan growth (see Foos, Norden and Weber, 2007).
24For this, the balance sheet variables are computed as the quarterly average over the sample period.
25Loan-loss allowances is the stock-variable that corresponds to the (￿ ow-variable) loan-loss provisions.
16The idea behind this proxy is that a bank which wants to expand its loan volume quickly,
presumably has to do so at the cost of accepting lower quality borrowers. Thus, one may
expect that banks with higher loan growth have lower loan quality. Consistent with this,
we ￿nd that such banks have a signi￿cantly higher CRI (where loan growth is computed as
the average loan growth over the sample period). The next variable is the ratio of interest
income from loans to total loans. The idea here is that banks will typically charge higher
rates on riskier loans, hence a high interest rate income may indicate a relatively risky loan
portfolio. As shown in the Table, there is indeed a positive and signi￿cant relationship
between this measure and banks￿perceived credit risk, as measured by the CRI. Finally
we consider a bank￿ s return on assets (ROA). The ROA may also increase with a bank￿ s
loan risk because banks may charge higher rates on riskier loans. However, it may also
decrease since riskier borrowers are also more likely to default. A priori, the relationship
is thus ambiguous. The Table shows there is no signi￿cant relation with the CRI.
We conclude from these ￿rst two sets of variables that the CRI is signi￿cantly related
to many alternative measures of loan and asset risk, and is so with the expected sign. The
next three variables considered are basic characteristics of banks￿balance sheets: leverage,
loan-to-asset ratio and size. First, there is a positive and signi￿cant relationship between
a bank￿ s leverage (as measured by the debt-to-asset ratio) and its CRI. An explanation for
this may be the risk preferences of banks: a bank which follows a high risk strategy may
jointly choose a high-risk loan portfolio and operate with high leverage. Note that since our
CRI is computed from relative credit risk sensitivities, there is no mechanical relationship
between the CRI and leverage which may arise from the fact that, everything else being
equal, highly leveraged banks are more sensitive to changes in credit risk. The same
argument also applies to our next variable, the banks￿loan-to-asset ratio. This variable
is found to be unrelated to the CRI. There is also no signi￿cant relationship between a
bank￿ s CRI and its size (as measured by log of assets). Previously we argued that there
is weak evidence that the very largest banks have higher CRIs. This new result suggests
that considering the entire range of asset distributions, there is no relationship between the
variables. There is, however, a positive relationship between size and CRI over the entire
sample period (￿rst two columns in the Table).
The next variable we consider is a bank￿ s share of real estate loans in its portfolio. This
variable is positively, and very signi￿cantly, related to a banks￿CRI. Hence banks with
more real estate lending are perceived by the market as having worse credit portfolios.
This result is consistent with the fact that most of the high risk subprime loans were
in the form of mortgages. Subprime related problems have also been associated with
securitization of real estate loans. One might argue that securitizing real estate loans
17o⁄ the balance sheet relieves a bank from a part of the bad credit risk, and should thus
lower bank risk. However, banks often keep the ￿rst-loss equity tranche of a securitization,
which is the highest risk tranche. This should reduce the (average) quality of banks￿credit
exposures. Moreover, banks may simply use the freed-up capital to extend new loans,26
which are presumably riskier. Thus, the relationship between credit risk and securitization
is theoretically ambiguous. In order to study this relationship empirically, we measure
securitization activities by means of a simple dummy variable, which takes the value of one
if the bank securitizes real estate loans at all, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable is
(marginally) insigni￿cant at the 10% level but becomes signi￿cant at the 5% level if the
total sample period is considered. There is thus weak evidence that banks that securitize
are perceived as having a higher credit risk.
In the last row of the Table we report the relationship between a bank￿ s CRI and
its share price performance during the subprime crisis. For this we take variable X to
be a bank￿ s share price change from June 15, 2007 to the end of the sample period. In
addition we restrict the estimation period to before this date. Thus, we test whether a
banks￿share price performance after this date is associated with its CRI estimated using
information before this date.27 It turns out that the CRI and subprime performance are
negatively related. This can be explained by the fact that the credit risk of lower-rated
assets typically increases more in a downturn and hence banks with a higher share of such
assets should su⁄er more. The relationship is also very signi￿cant. In the next section we
analyze this relationship in more detail.
4.5 The CRI & Banks￿Performance During the Subprime Crisis
The previous section has shown that a bank￿ s CRI, computed using information before
the subprime crisis, is related to its performance during the subprime crisis. This suggests
that the CRI may be a useful indicator of how a bank can withstand adverse conditions.
However, it may very well be that the information in a bank￿ s CRI which helps to explain
its subprime performance is equally contained in other, more traditional, proxies of bank
risk.
To address this question we should control for such proxies when analyzing the relation-
ship between the CRI and the subprime performance. Unfortunately, the one step-method
employed in the previous section, even though preferable in terms of e¢ ciency, cannot be
used for this.28 We thus carry out the analysis using a conventional two-step regression. In
26For a theoretical analysis of this e⁄ect, see Wagner (2007) and Wagner (2008).
27Note that June15, 2007 coincides with the start of the exclusion period. This period is hence excluded
by construction and we only report the regression results in the ￿rst two columns of the Table.
28Note that simply adding the proxies as independent variables to equation (11) does not solve the issue.
18the ￿rst stage, we estimate the bank-speci￿c CRIs using equation (10) for the sample up
to June 15, 2007. In the second stage, we regress a banks￿share price performance after
that date on these bank-speci￿c CRIs, adding the control variables. We thus estimate in
the second stage the following regression:
perfi = ￿ + ￿CRIi + ￿Yi + "i; (15)
where perfi is a bank￿ s share price change from June 15, 2007 to the end of the sample
period, and Yi is a vector of control variables. As controls we include the various variables
we considered in the previous section as potentially containing information similar to the
CRI. In addition, we also add measures of banks￿equity risk (share price beta and volatility,
estimated from daily data over the sample period). An issue that arises with estimating (15)
is that CRI is a generated regressor, which may pose some econometric issues. However, as
we argue in Appendix A, in our speci￿c setting these issues are unlikely to be important.
We ￿rst consider di⁄erent sets of control variables in isolation, before adding them all
jointly. Table 4 reports the results. In column 1 the regression without controls is reported.
In column 2 we include traditional measure of loan risk. In columns 3 and 4 the CRI is
tested alongside proxies for asset quality and general bank characteristics, respectively.
Column 5 controls for real estate activities, while the equity risk factors are included in
column 6. Finally, column 7 reports the results when all controls are included.
The main message is that the CRI is robust to the inclusion of these various controls.
The CRI is always signi￿cant at least at the 5% level, and is often so at the 1% level.
Its coe¢ cient is also relatively stable, ranging from -15 to -23. The size of the coe¢ cient
suggests that the relationship is economically relevant. A coe¢ cient of -20, for example,
implies that an increase in a bank￿ s CRI by 0.1 is associated with a share price performance
that is 8% worse than its peers.29 This is noteworthy since the subprime crisis is not only a
crisis of asset quality but crucially is also driven by liquidity and funding issues. It con￿rms
the expectation that in periods of crises (regardless of their origin) banks with lower asset
quality should be relatively more a⁄ected.
We also note that all signi￿cant control variables have the expected signs. Among
the traditional loan risk measures and proxies for asset risk (column 2 and 3), the loan
loss allowances, total risk weighted assets, and the interest income from loans all have a
negative sign, indicating that banks with a higher share of bad credits su⁄ered more during
the subprime crisis. In column 4 we can see that banks with a higher loan-to-asset ratio
This would only control the (daily) share price sensitivities to CDS-spread changes, which is very di⁄erent
from controlling the relationship between a bank￿ s CRI and its subprime performance.
29This number is obtained by transforming the absolute share price decline implied by a CRI change of
0.1 (=-20x0.1=-2) into a relative share price decline using the sample share price mean (=30.75).
19experienced a higher share price decline. We can also see that larger banks performed worse
as well, consistent with the notion that it was mainly those banks which engaged heavily in
real estate securitization activities. This interpretation is con￿rmed by the results reported
in column 5, which shows that banks with more real estate loans, and banks that securitize
those loans, perform worse as well. Somewhat surprising is the positive coe¢ cient for beta
(column 6), suggesting that banks with a higher beta performed better during the subprime
crisis. However, this e⁄ect vanishes in the full set of controls (column 7).
Column 7 also shows that, besides the CRI, only two of the ￿fteen control variables
are signi￿cant at the 5% level. This con￿rms the relevance of the CRI in explaining the
subprime performance. In particular, we note that all traditional loan risk proxies are
insigni￿cant. The only controls that remain signi￿cant are bank size and the share of real
estate loans. These are factors that played a speci￿c role in the current crisis but are not
general measures of bank risk. This is di⁄erent from the CRI, which is not construed to
re￿ ect characteristics of the crisis.
An alternative approach for studying the relation between the CRI and bank perfor-
mance in a crisis is to look directly at failed banks. For this we collect share prices for all
failed U.S. banks30 and estimate their CRIs (none of the banks are in our original dataset
of large BHCs). We end up with ￿ve banks that have complete data and liquid shares:
Downey Financial, Franklin Bank, Indymac Bancorp, PFF Bancorp, and Washington Mu-
tual. For the estimation of the CRIs we use two methods. First, we estimate a bank￿ s CRI
using information up to one month before its day of failure (as identi￿ed by the FDIC).
Second, we estimate it up to the date where the bank￿ s share price dropped in anticipation
of failure (as identi￿ed by visual inspection). This date is typically more than a month
before the failure of the bank and using this method hence reduces the in￿ uence of share
price ￿ uctuations directly connected with the bank failure. We ￿nd that for either method
each of the ￿ve bank￿ s CRI is larger than the mean of the banks in our sample. Their aver-
age CRIs for the ￿rst and second method are 0.28 and 0.21, respectively, and hence about
2-3 times the mean CRI of banks in our sample (0.11). This substantiates our previous
analysis of the CRI containing information about bank performance in crisis times.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a new measure of the quality of banks￿credit portfolios.
This measure is not restricted to the potential losses from defaulting loans but rather
captures credit risk in general. It thus includes exposures arising from a variety of bank
30As reported on the FDIC website http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html.
20activities, such as securitizations and credit derivatives. Since it is derived from market
prices, it comprises information from a wide range of sources and can, moreover, re￿ ect
new developments quickly. The credit risk indicator (CRI) is arguably also an independent
assessment of banks￿risks since it should be di¢ cult for banks to consistently manage their
share price sensitivities.
The CRI is a natural indicator of how well banks might perform in periods of a worsening
of credit risks in the economy. Indeed, we have found that the CRI could forecast the
performance of banks during the subprime crisis. The CRI may thus be used by regulators,
alongside other information, as a criterion for identifying potentially exposed institutions
well before a crisis materializes. It may also serve as an indicator for banks￿creditors
in gauging the riskiness of their loans, as well as being useful for bank shareholders in
assessing the ability of bank managers to make high quality investments.
The CRI may help us in the future to better understand the factors that drive a bank￿ s
credit quality. Previous research, which has mostly focused on balance sheet data as a
measure of credit quality, was constrained by the absence of comprehensive and indepen-
dent measures of credit quality. We believe it may be interesting to use the CRI to study
the in￿ uence of factors such as bank strategy (e.g., specialization, growth, relationship
orientation), geographical location or corporate governance for credit quality. The CRI
may also be of use for enhancing our understanding of how credit risk transfer activities
at banks (such as securitizations or trading in credit derivatives) impact credit quality.
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24Tables
Table 1: Aggregate CRI
dep.var.: ￿p Full Sample First Half Second Half
￿S&P500(orth) 0.0289*** 0.0348*** 0.0261***
(0.000274) (0.000441) (0.000350)
￿CDS-XO -0.0123*** -0.0133*** -0.0126***
(0.000457) (0.000797) (0.000550)
￿CDS-IG(orth) -0.0994*** -0.102*** -0.0982***
(0.00262) (0.00470) (0.00301)
￿1-Month Interest Rate -0.00322*** -0.00387*** -0.00316***
(0.000294) (0.000653) (0.000310)
￿10-Year Interest Rate -0.000755 0.000120 0.00111
(0.000621) (0.000870) (0.000849)
￿In￿ ation -0.00941*** -0.00504*** -0.0164***
(0.00131) (0.00164) (0.00209)
Constant -0.0174*** -0.00818*** -0.0260***
(0.00227) (0.00301) (0.00345)
Observations 72452 36320 36132
R2 0.259 0.196 0.302
CRI 0.1104 0.1157 0.1137
95% Con￿dence Interval 0.1001 0.1209 0.1011 0.1302 0.1012 0.1261
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
25Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Individual CRIs
Variable Observations Mean Median Min Max St.Dev.
CRI 150 0.1143 0.1082 -0.0329 0.4433 0.0626
Table 3 The Relationship between the CRI and Other Measures of Bank Risk
Period 15.06. ￿
Full sample 31.08.07 excluded
Coe⁄. SE Coe⁄. SE
Non-Performing Loans/TL 1.72847 1.45838 4.60598** 2.08664
Loan Loss Provisions/TL 6.19080* 3.47210 16.54446*** 4.58692
Loan Loss Allowance/TL 0.80538 2.15438 1.99673 2.62537
Net Charge O⁄s/TL 1.80995 3.55156 7.19843* 4.36488
Tot. Risk Weight. Assets/TA -0.00626 0.05728 0.00844 0.07019
Loan Growth 0.51373** 0.25560 0.68211** 0.32522
Interest from Loans/TL 1.37607 1.26868 3.87150** 1.69372
ROA 0.49748 1.48117 -2.23820 1.79071
Debt/TA 0.34849 0.26192 0.76402** 0.31261
Loans/TA -0.04743 0.05707 0.03401 0.07189
log(TA) 0.01499*** 0.00465 -0.00056 0.00573
Real Estate Loans/TL 0.04361 0.04679 0.17752*** 0.06469
Dummy Sec. Real Est. Loans 0.05155** 0.02230 0.04437 0.02704
Subprime Perform. -0.00400*** 0.00131 . .
TL= Total Loans; TA= Total Assets; Sec. = Securitization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
26Table 4 Subprime Performance
Dep.Var.: perf (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CRI -20.66*** -23.44*** -20.07** -14.05** -21.32*** -15.04** -16.83**
(7.097) (7.117) (8.038) (7.021) (7.185) (7.219) (6.694)
Non-Performing Loans/TL -2.457 36.40
(37.69) (105.6)
Loan Loss Provisions/TL 1001 1999
(1531) (1582)
Loan Loss Allowance/TL -651.9** -451.6*
(261.9) (233.8)
Net Charge O⁄s/TL -1352 -1591
(1711) (1733)
Tot. Risk Weight. Assets/TA -21.66*** -12.16
(5.556) (9.000)
Loan Growth -27.12 -14.98
(18.72) (19.37)










Real Estate Loans/TL -7.306* -8.825**
(3.974) (3.990)






Constant -3.972*** 4.282 19.78*** 26.02 2.383 -11.22*** 57.56**
(0.942) (3.168) (6.055) (26.30) (2.977) (3.721) (27.73)
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
R2 0.072 0.138 0.211 0.267 0.155 0.113 0.381
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 3: Scatterplot of individual CRIs
29Appendix A: The CRI When There is More Complex
Relationship between Loans and Bank Equity
The model in Section 3 presumes that changes in the value of a bank￿ s loan portfolio
translate one-to-one into changes in the bank￿ s equity (in equation (5) we have 4V (E) =
4V (Loans) for 4V (C) = 4V (S) = 4V (D) = 0). This may not always be the case. In
particular, if a bank is close to default the one-to-one relationship may break down due to
the option value of equity (as predicted by the Merton-model) or due to value of deposit
insurance. Suppose now instead that we have more generally V (E) = f(V (Loans)), where
f is a continuous and monotonically increasing function but not constrained to be linear.
The function f may also depend on other bank characteristics, such as its level of debt.
Using equation (6), we can obtain a ￿rst-order approximation of 4p caused by changes in






1 + rLoans 4 CDS
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Hi ￿ f0(V (Loans))
1 + rLoans 4 CDS
H ￿
L ￿ f0(V (Loans))
1 + rLoans 4 CDS
L. (16)
The ￿i and ￿i estimated from equation (7) will hence be equal to ￿i = ￿
Hi￿f0(V (Loansi))
1+rLoans
and ￿i = ￿
Li￿f0(V (Loansi))
1+rLoans . Thus, if we compute the CRI according to equation (8) we still

















30Appendix B: Generated Regressors
Since we are using two stages in our analysis (in the ￿rst we estimate CRIs at the bank
level, which we later include in the second stage as regressors), our analysis may su⁄er from
generated regressor problems (see, for example, Pagan, 1984). While replacing a regressor
with its estimate in an OLS regression causes no problems for consistency (Wooldridge,
2002, p.115), it might do so for inference. This is because the standard errors obtained are
often invalid as they ignore the sampling variation of the estimated regressor. However,
this problem should not apply in our setting since we use di⁄erent dimensions in each stage:
in the ￿rst stage we use the time dimension t (which ranges from 1 to 526) to obtain CRI
estimates at the bank level, while in the second stage we use the cross-sectional dimension
i (ranging from 1 to 150). Since our time dimension is large both in an absolute sense and
relative to the cross-sectional dimension (more than three times larger), asymptotic theory
can be applied here. Based on this theory, the CRIs estimated in the ￿rst step should be
asymptotically precise so that we can draw valid statistical inferences from it when using
it in the second stage of our regression.
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